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Robustness Analysis
Michael Weisberg†‡
Modelers often rely on robustness analysis, the search for predictions common to
several independent models. Robustness analysis has been characterized and cham-
pioned by Richard Levins and William Wimsatt, who see it as central to modern
theoretical practice. The practice has also been severely criticized by Steven Orzack
and Elliott Sober, who claim that it is a nonempirical form of confirmation, effective
only under unusual circumstances. This paper addresses Orzack and Sober’s criticisms
by giving a new account of robustness analysis and showing how the practice can
identify robust theorems. Once the structure of robust theorems is clearly articulated,
it can be shown that such theorems have a degree of confirmation, despite the lack of
direct empirical evidence for their truth.
1. Introduction. Physical scientists can often construct and analyze mod-
els that are derived from fully developed, well-confirmed background the-
ories. A scientist in possession of such a theory can be very confident
about her ability to construct realistic models and to make accurate pre-
dictions with these models. Newtonian mechanics, for example, is so well
developed that mathematical models derived from it have guided satellites
to other planets in our solar system.
Unfortunately, many phenomena, such as those studied by population
biologists, have yet to be described by comprehensive theories, and it is
unlikely that such theories will be developed in the near future. There is
a large body of theoretical work in ecology, evolution, and systematics,
but there are few overarching background theories that unify these do-
mains. Thus in population biology and other sciences that deal with highly
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complex systems, theorists generate multiple models for individual phe-
nomena, all of which are idealized.
If this situation occurred when dealing with simple physical systems,
one of the fundamental physical theories could be used to determine how
much distortion was introduced by each idealization. Such theories have
the resources to estimate the effect of various idealizations, providing
guidance about what must be included when particular degrees of ac-
curacy and precision are required. In the study of many complex systems,
however, such a theory is unavailable. Theorists thus require an alternative
method for determining which models make trustworthy predictions and
which models can reliably be used in explanations. Robustness analysis
provides such an alternative method.
According to Richard Levins, robustness analysis can show us “whether
a result depends on the essentials of the model or on the details of the
simplifying assumptions” (1966, 20). This is accomplished by studying a
number of similar, but distinct, models of the same phenomenon:
[I]f these models, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar
results, we have what we can call a robust theorem that is relatively
free of the details of the model. Hence, our truth is the intersection
of independent lies. (20)
Despite its importance in scientific practice, robustness analysis has
received surprisingly little attention in the literature about scientific
method. Although Levins drew attention to the idea 40 years ago in his
well-known paper “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biol-
ogy” (1966), until recently, only William Wimsatt, Steven Orzack, and
Elliott Sober have discussed the topic in detail. In a sympathetic recon-
struction, Wimsatt explains the core idea behind robustness analysis:
[A]ll the variants and uses of robustness have a common theme in
the distinguishing of the real from the illusory; the reliable from the
unreliable; the objective from the subjective; the object of focus from
artifacts of perspective; and, in general, that which is regarded as
ontologically and epistemologically trustworthy and valuable from
that which is unreliable, ungeneralizable, worthless, and fleeting.
(1981, 128)
From Wimsatt, we learn that robustness analysis’s aim is to separate the
scientifically important parts and predictions of our models from the il-
lusory ones that are accidents of representations—something physicists
do using their comprehensive theories.
Not all philosophers of science have been sympathetic to Levins’ idea
of robustness analysis. In a review of “The Strategy,” Orzack and Sober
(1993) argue that robustness analysis appears to be a form of nonempirical
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confirmation and thus has no place in scientific practice. In this paper, I
endeavor to answer Orzack and Sober’s criticism of the efficacy of ro-
bustness analysis. This requires developing a more detailed, albeit prelim-
inary, account of robustness analysis and the notion of a ‘robust theorem’.
I will argue that robustness analysis is effective at identifying robust the-
orems, and while it is not itself a confirmation procedure, robust theorems
are likely to be true.
2. Orzack and Sober on Robustness. Levins’ original discussion of ro-
bustness analysis provides little general characterization of the practice.
Although he discusses several examples, the only abstract characterization
that Levins gives is something like the following: When confronted with
multiple models of the same phenomenon, the theorist needs a way to
separate reliable predictions from artifacts of the assumptions made by
the different models. Thus the theorist examines multiple models, pref-
erably ones that make qualitatively different assumptions about the phe-
nomenon, and looks for a common prediction among these models. This
common prediction is the “truth at the intersection of independent lies,”
or a robust theorem.
Since Levins provides no further account of robustness analysis, Orzack
and Sober begin their critique by providing an interpretation of Levins’
article. The first issue they discuss is whether robustness analysis is sup-
posed to be a form of confirmation or merely a heuristic of some kind.
They conclude that it is intended to be a novel, nonempirical form of
confirmation:
When [Levins] further writes (p. 427) that a particular “non-robust”
theorem “cannot be asserted as a biological fact” it becomes clear
that Levins means that a statement’s robustness, as distinct from its
observational confirmation, can be evidence for its truth. (Orzack and
Sober 1993, 538)
Their second step toward giving a more formal account of robustness
analysis involves defining the term ‘robust theorem’. On Orzack and So-
ber’s reading, robust theorems are literally theorems, propositions that
are the logical consequence of each member of a set of models. Sche-
matically, robustness analysis consists in analyzing a set of models M ,1
and showing that, for every i, . Robustness analysis is. . . , M M X Rn i
thus the search for this type of implication, which is supposed to generate
confirmation.
Since robustness analysis is conducted by examining models, not data,
Orzack and Sober argue that this procedure is nonempirical. Hence they
believe that Levins is promoting a distinct form of confirmation, one that
does not involve examining data. Rightly skeptical of nonempirical con-
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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firmation, Orzack and Sober present an argument that is intended to show
the ineffectiveness of such a procedure.
The argument begins by enumerating possible circumstances under
which a theorist might engage in robustness analysis. Considered ab-
stractly, Orzack and Sober argue, there are three possible circumstances:
The theorist either knows that all the models in the set are false, knows
that at least one is true, or does not know whether any of them are true.
Robustness analysis, they argue, is sure to yield a true theorem only in
the case in which we know ahead of time that at least one model in the
set is true. In the other two cases, knowing that R is entailed by each
provides no evidence about the truth of R.Mi
One can further develop Orzack and Sober’s argument with the fol-
lowing line of reasoning: If we knew that all the models in the set were
true, we would not need robustness analysis in the first place. Robustness
analysis is supposed to help us precisely in situations in which all the
models are idealized (i.e., false), and we want to know what results drawn
from our models are reasonable to believe. Since robustness analysis is
ineffective in this case, it can never be a useful tool.
In his response to Orzack and Sober’s analysis, Levins accuses them
of providing an analysis that “is not relevant to the problem that was
posed” (1993, 533). He also argues that Orzack and Sober’s characteri-
zation of robustness as a rival to ordinary empirical confirmation is mis-
taken. Observation, he tells us, is not forsaken in robustness analysis:
Observation enters first in the choice of the core model and the
selection of plausible variable parts, and later in the testing of the
predictions that follow from the core model. (554)
Further elaborating his original position, Levins tells us that “the search
for robust theorems reflects the strategy of determining how much we can
get away with not knowing, and still understand the system” (554).
In these passages, Levins is characterizing robustness analysis quite
differently than Orzack and Sober have. Levins does not believe that he
is offering an alternative to empirical confirmation, yet he is vague about
the exact nature of robustness analysis. He says that it concerns “how
much we can get away with not knowing” while “still understand[ing]”
biological phenomena, but does not tell us how it helps to confirm models
and their predictions.
Despite sympathizing with Orzack and Sober’s desire for a more de-
tailed account and defense of robustness, I believe that their analysis is
too abstract to be used for this purpose. While I do not dispute the validity
of their argument for arbitrary sets of models and arbitrary logical con-
sequences of those models, this result does not necessarily apply to specific
subsets of models or to particular kinds of logical consequences of these
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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models. In fact, I will argue in Section 4 that robustness analysis can play
a role in confirming hypotheses because of the structure of these
hypotheses.
Despite this problem, Orzack and Sober’s criticisms helpfully suggest
a way to begin analyzing robustness analysis. Like them, I believe that
the first step toward analyzing robustness is to clarify the concepts of
‘robust theorem’ and ‘robustness analysis’. Only after we understand the
nature of these concepts can we consider the rationality of employing
robustness analysis.
3. Discovering Robust Theorems. The structure of robust theorems and
the nature of robustness analysis are best appreciated through an ex-
amination of real scientific examples, not abstract philosophical analysis.
Models of predator-prey interactions have been thoroughly studied by
ecologists, and this study has yielded several robust as well as many
nonrobust theorems. This makes predator-prey models excellent examples
with which to study robustness analysis. In Section 3.1, I will describe
how theorists have analyzed models of predator-prey systems to discover
a robust theorem called the Volterra principle. This will form the basis
of a more general characterization of robustness analysis that I give in
Section 3.2.
3.1. The Volterra Principle. The simplest predator-prey model is known
as the Volterra model or the Lotka-Volterra model, as it was independently
analyzed by Alfred Lotka (1956) and Vito Volterra (1926a, 1926b). In
this model, V represents the size of the prey population and P the size
of the predator population. The parameter r stands for the intrinsic growth
rate of the prey population, m is the intrinsic death rate of the predators,
and the other parameters (a and b) correspond to the prey capture rate
and the rate at which each predator converts captured prey into more
predator births. The model is described with the following differential
equations:
dV
p rV (aV )P, (1)
dt
dP
p b(aV )PmP. (2)
dt
This model exhibits a regular, periodic oscillation in the size of both
the predator and prey populations. Since there is no stable equilibrium
described by these equations, the model predicts that the populations will
oscillate indefinitely. In addition, the amplitude of the oscillations (peak
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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size of the populations) depends only on the initial conditions, not on the
values for the parameters in the model. These two features are not robust,
and a slight change to the model, such as the introduction of density
dependence, will cause them to vanish. However, there is one important
property of the model that is robust. This property can be seen when we
consider how a general pesticide, an intervention that kills both predators
and prey, affects the populations. Further analysis is required to discover
this effect.
Although equations (1) and (2) describe a model with no stable equi-
librium, there is one unstable equilibrium that corresponds to the time-
averaged size of the two model populations (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998,
16). We can find this equilibrium by setting each differential equation to
zero and doing some algebra:
r
ˆPp , (3)
a
m
ˆVp . (4)
ab
We now need to examine what will happen when both populations are
affected by a general pesticide. The easiest way to do this is to consider
what happens to the ratio (r) of the average size of the predator population
to the average size of the prey population.
From equations (3) and (4), we can see that
ˆP rb
rp p . (5)
ˆ mV
The next step is to consider how the general pesticide affects this ratio.
If we treat the pesticide as roughly equivalent to decreasing the intrinsic
growth rate of the prey and increasing the intrinsic death rate of the
predators, we find that r(pesticide) ! r(normal). Since smaller values for
r mean a larger relative size of the prey population, the population of
prey will increase relative to the number of predators upon application
of the pesticide. This result is known as the Volterra principle (Rough-
garden 1979, 439). In order to see whether this property is robust, we will
need to examine other models of predation.
Since some of the other properties of the Volterra model are destroyed
by the introduction of density dependence, one obvious model to consider
adds density dependence to the simple Volterra model. This can be ac-
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complished by adding to equation (1) a term for the prey population’s
carrying capacity. The model can then be represented as follows:
dV V
p r 1 V (aV )P, (6)( )dt K
dP
p b(aV )PmP. (7)
dt
After solving once again for the equilibrium values, which gives us the
average population sizes, we can express the ratio r as
ˆP r(abKm)
rp p . (8)
ˆ aKmV
By inspection, we can see that, once again, r(pesticide) ! r(normal). The
Volterra principle continues to hold even in this case, where much of the
original model’s behavior has changed.
We can continue making the model more complicated by, for example,
adding a term for predator satiation. This can be accomplished by in-
corporating a parameter c corresponding to the maximum rate of prey
capture per predator. Incorporating this term into the density-dependent
model, we get
dV V
aV/cp r 1 V c(1 e )P, (9)( )dt K
dP
aV/cp bc(1 e )PmP. (10)
dt
Analyzing this model is much more complicated because of the exponen-
tial terms and because the model exhibits limit cycles (May 2001). How-
ever, upon analyzing the model, we find that the Volterra principle still
obtains. The introduction of a general pesticide will increase the relative
number of prey.
If we continue this analysis with other models, we will see that the
Volterra principle describes a property true of many distinct predator-
prey models. This principle is an example of what I call a robust property,
a dynamic or static property common to many models making different
idealizing assumptions.
Discovering robust properties is not the end of robustness analysis.
Such a discovery is followed by an investigation of common features of
the models to determine which common feature, if any, gives rise to the
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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property in each case. The structure common to the models that gives
rise to the robust property is what I will call the common structure. Further
analysis of predator-prey models, for example, shows that the Volterra
principle arises in “any model in which the abundance of predators is
controlled mostly by the growth rate of the prey and the abundance of
prey by the death rate of the predators” (Roughgarden 1979, 439).
Putting the common structure and robust property together to form a
conditional hypothesis, we can formulate the robust theorem as follows:
Ceteris paribus, if the abundance of predators is controlled mostly
by the growth rate of the prey and the abundance of the prey con-
trolled mostly by the death rate of predators, then a general pesticide
will increase the abundance of the prey and decrease the abundance
of predators.
This robust theorem is a hypothesis about the properties of a large set of
actual and possible predator-prey systems, positing the effect of a general
pesticide on these systems. It is highly abstract; no mention is made of
particular predator-prey systems such as the lynx-hare system, the shark-
cod system, or the HIV virus/host cell system. The hypothesis simply
describes the effect of a causal structure on a highly general class of
systems.
3.2. Robust Theorems and Robustness Analysis. The analysis of pred-
ator-prey models and the discovery of the Volterra principle provide an
excellent template for a more general characterization of robustness anal-
ysis and the structure of robust theorems. Robustness analysis can be
described as a four-step procedure, although some of the steps can be
carried out simultaneously. It begins by examining a group of models to
determine if they all predict a common result, the robust property. The
second step involves analyzing the models for the common structure that
generates the robust property. Results from the first and second steps are
combined to formulate the robust theorem itself, a conditional statement
linking common structure to robust property, prefaced by a ceteris paribus
clause. The third step gives an empirical interpretation of the mathematical
structures combined into the conditional form. Finally, the theorist can
conduct stability analysis of the robust theorem to determine what con-
ditions will defeat the connection between common structure and robust
property. Let’s consider some of these steps in more detail.
Robustness analysis begins by examining a group of similar, but distinct,
models for a robust behavior. During this stage it is important to collect
a sufficiently diverse set of models so that the discovery of a robust prop-
erty does not depend in an arbitrary way on the set of models analyzed.
The first step is either followed by or conducted in parallel with the second,
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which involves finding the core structure that gives rise to the robust
property.
In straightforward cases, the common structure is literally the same
mathematical structure in each model. In such cases one can isolate the
common structure and, using mathematical analysis, verify the fact that
the common structure gives rise to the robust property. However, such a
procedure is not always possible because models may be developed in
different mathematical frameworks or may represent a similar causal
structure in different ways or at different levels of abstraction. Such cases
are much harder to describe in general, relying as they do on the theorist’s
ability to judge relevantly similar structures. In the most rigorous cases,
theorists can demonstrate that each token of the common structure gives
rise to the robust behavior and that the tokens of the common structure
contain important mathematical similarities, not just intuitive qualitative
similarities. However, there are occasions in which theorists rely on judg-
ment and experience, not mathematics or simulation, to make such
determinations.
After the first and second stages of robustness analysis, the theorist has
formal or mathematical information, but not an empirical description.
She knows that one mathematical structure, the common structure, gives
rise to another, the robust property. Modeling is typically aimed at telling
us something about the real world, and theorists want to know about the
properties of real-world phenomena, not mathematical structures. So the
third step of robustness analysis involves interpreting the mathematical
structures as descriptions of empirical phenomena. In the predation case,
theorists have to decide how two coupled differential equations will ex-
plicitly map on to the properties of real or imagined predator-prey systems.
After the first three stages of robustness analysis, theorists can formulate
robust theorems. They have the following general form:
Ceteris paribus, if [common causal structure] obtains, then [robust
property] will obtain.
The fourth and final step of robustness analysis consists of various
kinds of stability analysis, the purpose of which is to determine what
happens to the robust theorem when the situation described by the set of
models varies slightly. Consider the predator-prey model example. One
way to think about the transition from the model described by equations
(2) and (1) to the one described by (7) and (6) is to ask what happens to
the behavior of the model when density dependence, even an arbitrarily
small amount of it, is factored into the model. Many of the properties of
the original model are destroyed, but the Volterra principle remains. So
we know that the Volterra principle is insensitive to density dependence.
In robustness analysis, this sort of analysis is typically carried out on as
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many dimensions as possible. It may ultimately be possible to replace a
robust theorem’s general ceteris paribus clause with a very specific state-
ment of the conditions that defeat the efficacy of the core structure in
generating the robust properties.1
So far, I have described only the procedures theorists use to discover
robust theorems. These procedures are important in themselves, but are
not the full story. A common reason theorists engage in robustness analysis
is to increase the quality of their predictions and explanations about real
phenomena. Although useful for both of these purposes, the theorems
generated by robustness analysis cannot fulfill either role alone because
they are conditional statements, further attenuated with ceteris paribus
clauses. Explaining a real-world phenomenon or predicting its occurrence
requires us to know that the common structure is actually being instan-
tiated and that no other causal factor is preempting the efficacy of the
common structure.
One way to determine if the common structure is being instantiated
and if any preempting causes are present is to conduct an empirical in-
vestigation. While this is the most reliable way to ensure that a robust
theorem can be applied, it is often impractical or impossible to collect
the relevant data. In fact, robustness analysis is usually introduced in
situations in which data are hard to obtain. Fortunately, there is an al-
ternative that, while not completely reliable, can give us good reasons to
believe the predictions and explanations of robust theorems. The alter-
native involves answering two key questions:
1. How frequently is the common structure instantiated in the relevant
kind of system?
2. How equal do things have to be in order for the core structure to
give rise to the robust property?
Although the first question is best settled empirically, it can be partially
addressed using techniques associated with robustness analysis. The key
comes in ensuring that a sufficiently heterogeneous set of situations is
covered in the set of models subjected to robustness analysis. If a suffi-
ciently heterogeneous set of models for a phenomenon all have the com-
mon structure, then it is very likely that the real-world phenomenon has
a corresponding causal structure. This would allow us to infer that when
we observe the robust property in a real system, then it is likely that the
core structure is present and that it is giving rise to the property.
The second question can be more easily addressed as finding that its
answer is part of the fourth step of robustness analysis itself. In order to
1. Such a procedure is carried out in Skyrms (2000).
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determine how sensitive a robust property is to perturbations, theorists
engage in various kinds of stability analyses. If fully carried out, the fourth
step of robustness analysis provides enough information to determine
what kinds of perturbations will preempt the occurrence of the robust
property, even when the core structure is instantiated.
4. Robustness Analysis’s Confirmatory Power. Orzack and Sober’s central
criticism of robustness analysis is that it is a nonempirical form of con-
firmation. Since it is a set of procedures conducted on a set of models, it
should be able to generate only mathematical, not empirical, results. Yet
the third step of robustness analysis involves generating hypotheses about
actual and physically possible empirical phenomena. Is this move from a
mathematical fact to an empirical claim as illicit as Orzack and Sober
claim?
While the transition from mathematical to empirical may look illicit
when described as “nonempirical confirmation,” it is actually part of a
well-accepted theoretical practice that is so common, it is rarely discussed
explicitly. In every scientific domain, theorists must establish that the
mathematical framework in which their theories are framed can ade-
quately represent the phenomena of interest. By way of example, consider
models of population growth. Standard issues in confirmation theory
concern whether a particular kind of model, such as the logistic growth
model, is confirmed by the available data. However, there is a prior
confirmation-theoretic question that is often asked only implicitly: If the
population is growing logistically, can the mathematics of the logistic
growth model adequately represent this growth? Theorists rarely articulate
such questions in research articles, but an affirmative answer underlies
their research.
Despite rarely being discussed explicitly, theorists’ confidence in their
ability to represent phenomena with their models did not come for free.
It was minimally established by demonstrating that the relevant mathe-
matics could be deployed to make correct predictions. It may also have
been investigated explicitly by mathematicians. These investigations result
in what I will call low-level confirmation, confirmation of the fact that
certain mathematical structures can adequately represent properties of
target phenomena.
Low-level confirmation is what allows robust theorems to make claims
about real-world phenomena. To see how this works, consider the logistic
model once again. If a biologist observes a population for 20 generations
and determines that it is growing logistically with a carrying capacity K,
it is reasonable for her to continue using the logistic model to project the
growth of the population into the future. This is an empirically risky, but
reasonable, hypothesis.
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There is an even less risky hypothesis that can be adopted:
If the population is growing logistically, then the logistic model will
continue to make accurate predictions about the population’s size in
the future.
While she cannot know for sure whether the population will continue to
grow logistically, this conditional hypothesis seems almost assured because
we believe that logistic growth can be accurately represented with the
mathematics of the logistic model. Our confidence comes from low-level
confirmation.
Robustness analysis also relies on low-level confirmation, insofar as it
can produce robust theorems that are confirmed. The first two steps of
robustness analysis are concerned with finding the antecedent and con-
sequent that replace the dummy letters in the conditional statement: “Cet-
eris paribus, if structure S is found, then property P will be instantiated.”
These steps, however, are only mathematical. They help us discover the
relationship between S and P and may even help us verify this relationship,
but this is strictly mathematical; nothing empirical has been demonstrated.
Low-level confirmation starts to play a role in the third stage of robustness
analysis; it licenses us to regard the mathematical dependence of P on S
as a causal dependence.
In the predation case, for example, we are confident that ecological
relationships can be represented with the models described by coupled
differential equations. Thus when we discover the consequences of these
models, we are confident that most of these consequences are true of any
system described by the model. This confidence comes from low-level
confirmation, not from robustness analysis itself. Thus robustness analysis
is not a nonempirical form of confirmation as Orzack and Sober suggest.
It does not confirm robust theorems; it identifies hypotheses whose con-
firmation derives from the low-level confirmation of the mathematical
framework in which they are embedded.
5. Conclusions. Orzack and Sober criticize a simplified version of ro-
bustness analysis that involves the identification of robust properties and
the treatment of such properties as true descriptions of real phenomena.
The analysis presented in this paper shows that the discovery of robust
properties is only one part of robustness analysis. A fully formed robust
theorem has three parts: a common structure, a robust property, and a
set of ceteris paribus conditions.
To use robust theorems in the ways that Orzack and Sober envision,
a theorist must take two additional steps beyond discovering a robust
theorem. For each phenomenon of interest, the theorist has to argue for
the occurrence of the common structure. This could be accomplished
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either by direct empirical determination or by gaining evidence about the
ubiquity of the structure across similar phenomena of interest. She then
must show that there are no preempting causes or other reasons that
interfere with the common structure giving rise to the robust property.
Only after completing these two steps can a theorist assert, with any
certainty, that the robust property described in her robust theorem is being
instantiated.
Regarding robustness analysis as a nonempirical form of confirmation
is also an oversimplification, one that distorts the origin of the confir-
matory weight attached to robust theorems. We are now in a position to
see why: Robustness analysis helps to identify robust theorems, but it
does not confirm them. Such theorems are confirmed via low-level con-
firmation, the sort of confirmation that licenses the use of a framework
to construct models of phenomena in the first place.
Philosophers of science have begun to recognize the unique features of
the sciences, such as population biology, that deal with highly complex
phenomena. One of the most important contributions philosophy of sci-
ence can make is to understand the theoretical tools that must be employed
when dealing with such phenomena. Robustness analysis is an indis-
pensable procedure in the arsenal of theorists studying complex phenom-
ena. We must understand it and make room for it in our accounts of
theory construction and testing.
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